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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the relationship between Big 4 auditor industry specialisation and audit pricing 
in the U.K. in a period of many changes having taken place in the market for audit services. Using a 
large dataset between 2004 and 2011, our empirical results show a significantly higher fee premium for 
the Big 4 firms who are national industry leaders as compared to city-specific industry leaders, and that 
the fee premium for industry leadership is only earned by the city-specific industry leaders if and when 
they are also the national leaders. Neither the national nor city level industry leadership alone is priced 
anymore in the U.K. audit market. These findings hold for the pre- and the post-GFC period only and 
for a number of additional analyses.  The evidence suggests that the Big 4 industry leadership in the 
U.K. has moved away from the previously documented premium for the Big 4 city-specific industry 
leadership alone, and is now driven solely by the joint Big 4 industry expertise at the national and city-
specific levels concurrently. The study’s results indicate that there is a progression from city-specific 
industry expertise to national-specific industry expertise, and they imply that there has been an 
improvement in the sharing and transferability of industry knowledge and expertise among the city 
offices of the Big 4 firms in the U.K. in the period of investigation.  
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Big 4 Audit Fee Premiums for National and City-Specific Industry 
Leadership in the United Kingdom: Additional Evidence 
 
Introduction 
In the aftermath of major accounting and audit scandals at the start of the century, regulators and audit 
professionals have been seeking to regain the confidence of financial statements' users. The market of 
audit services globally has changed significantly in the recent years, and especially after the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC), as more and more initiatives are being explored by the regulators and the 
accounting profession in an effort to enhance the quality of the information in the markets. Using a 
sample of non-financial publicly listed companies in the U.K. for the period 2004-2011, we explore 
whether the previous documented audit fee premium earned by Big 4 industry specialists1 holds in the 
pre- and post-GFC periods and during the GFC, given the various regulatory interventions at the U.K. 
and E.U. levels, the impact of the GFC, and other global advances in technology and recruitment. 
 
The relationship between the audit fee premium/discount and industry specialisation is an interesting 
and controversial research area globally. Research studies concerning this area have mainly examined 
the U.S. (e.g., Hogan and Jeter, 1999; Francis et al., 2005), U.K. (e.g. Basioudis and Francis, 2007) and 
Australia (e.g., Craswell et al., 1995), and some other jurisdictions like Hong Kong (DeFond et al., 
2000) and New Zealand (Hay and Jeter, 2011). Auditor industry specialisation is recognised as a form 
of auditor competency in delivering high quality audits (DeFond and Zhang, 2014), given their superior 
knowledge of the industry’s business and accounting practices than non-specialists (Habib, 2011). The 
merger of the Big N accounting firms into the current Big 4 firms was partly driven by their intention 
to focus on industry specialisation (GAO, 2003), and the establishment of industry specialist status is 
seen as an important strategy in order for the audit firm to signal their ability to provide higher audit 
quality. 
Since 2002, the passing of Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the U.S. and the various other regulatory reforms 
emanated by the European Union (E.U.) or the U.K. government have instigated some dramatic changes 
in the capital market in the U.K., in an attempt to enhance the quality of corporate governance, financial 
reporting and the audit function. These include the establishment of the Professional Oversight Board 
(POB) in 2004 by the U.K. regulator, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), through the Audit 
Inspection Unit (AIU), with the responsibility to review the quality of audits performed on the public 
listed companies, and the mandatory adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
for all listed companies in 2005.  
3 
 
The GFC in 2007-2008 has provoked the investigation of the concentration and competition in the audit 
market by the House of Lords and the Office of Fair Trading in the U.K., and the issuance of the U.K. 
Corporate Governance Code in 2010 (revised in 2012 and 2014), the U.K. Stewardship Code (revised 
in 2012) and the Audit Firm Governance Code (revised in 2016) by the FRC.  
In light of these regulatory developments and declining economic conditions due to GFC, it is plausible 
to assume that audit firms might have changed their structure, norms and the way they operate to 
respond to this more challenging business and audit environment (Firth, 2002; Srinidhi and Gul, 2007). 
Nonetheless, the impact of macroeconomic changes, and especially the GFC, on audit pricing is largely 
unknown when compared to the pre-GFC period which suggests a need for further research in this area.  
Past experience also suggests that audit firms and capital markets adapt themselves differently after 
regulatory changes and major economic downturns (Economist, 2013; Chin, 2014). We argue that not 
all audit firms respond in the same way and the impact of those exogenous shocks can be diverse and 
unique to each firm. Consistently, prior studies in the Europe, Australia, the U.K. and the U.S. 
demonstrate that audit firms adjust their fees differently to reflect their changed level of audit effort in 
respond to the impact of GFC (Xu et al., 2013; Krishnan and Zhang, 2013; Hassan et al., 2014) and the 
mandatory IFRS adoption on the public listed entities (Kim et al., 2012; De George et al., 2013; Hassan 
et al., 2014). 
Whilst these studies examined the impact of the recent changing audit environment on the generic Big 
4 firms’ brand name reputation, there is still absence of a research study that empirically examines the 
impact of these recent period developments on the Big 4 differentiation strategy through industry 
specialisation. In the post-Enron environment, there is some regulatory emphasis on the importance of 
good audit firm governance at the national level (FRC, 2010), and given the rapidly changing global 
and technology dependent economy and increased globalisation of the marketplace, we argue that it 
makes sense to assume that there may have been some pressure on audit firms to promote their national 
level expertise as opposed to local‐office expertise. Furthermore, various interventions by the regulators 
and/or the accounting profession as well as other exogenous changes such as technological advances 
can cause changes in the specialisation investments of audit firms and which in turn may initiate 
progression or movement in the audit firm industry specialisation premiums observed over time.  
Using a sample of non-financial publicly listed companies in the U.K. for the period 2004-2011, and 
applying the national-city industry specialisation framework developed by Ferguson et al. (2003), we 
explore whether the previous documented audit fee premium earned by Big 4 industry specialists holds 
in the pre-GFC (2004-2006), post-GFC (2009-2011) and during the GFC (2007-2008) periods. Contrary 
to prior studies, we utilise data from a longer time period and also seek to determine whether different 
conclusions can be drawn in the period after the GFC (i.e., the period 2009-2011) as compared to the 
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U.K. evidence in prior periods (e.g. Basioudis and Francis, 2007). We conjecture that in order for the 
Big 4 firm to have a meaningful differentiation strategy based on industry specialisation, they need to 
demonstrate their ability to deliver uniform audit quality across the country within a particular industry. 
This is done by ensuring standardised industry expertise is being provided across the city-offices of an 
audit firm so as not to jeopardise or isolate any cities from this positive network externalities. Any shift 
in the focus of the auditor industry specialisation strategy is expected to be reflected in the changes in 
the industry leadership premium at the national and city level. 
Interestingly, we find evidence that a fee premium for industry leadership is only earned by the Big 4 
city-specific industry leaders if and when they are also national industry leaders (the premium averages 
at 7.1 percent), and that neither the national industry leadership alone nor the city-specific industry 
leadership alone is priced in the U.K. audit market anymore. These findings are in contrast to the earlier 
U.K. study by Basioudis and Francis (2007), indicating a shift in the way Big 4 audit firms earn audit 
fee premiums in the U.K. audit market. The empirical results of the current study imply that auditor 
industry leadership at the national (firm-wide) level and at the city-specific (office) level have both got 
an impact on audit pricing in the U.K. From the demand side of the market, this shows that the market 
intuitively perceives that the Big 4 industry expertise is only credible when the auditor is jointly the 
national industry leader and city-specific industry leader, and that this credibility is valued and priced 
in the audit market relative to national or city-specific industry leaderships alone.  
Based on our present evidence, the auditor industry leadership phenomenon in the U.K. appears to be 
similar to Australia rather than the U.S. or New Zealand, where the fee premium only exists for joint 
national and city-specific industry leaders, although the results from the U.S. and Australia are quite 
dated. Our evidence of the industry leadership premium for Big 4 firms who are joint national and city-
specific industry leaders remains consistent using an alternative industry classification scheme, 
alternative definition of auditor industry leadership, dropping uncompetitive audit markets, in different 
sub-samples based on the client’s size, risk and growth categorisation, and when using total assets and 
total sales as alternative measures of market shares. 
Our analysis of the industry market shares shows that the top-ranked auditor per industry has on average 
a national market share of 59 percent of the total industry audit fees, which is higher as compared to 45 
percent reported in the only prior U.K. study (Basioudis and Francis, 2007). The Big 4 national industry 
leaders now earn an average premium of 5.65 percent relative to the other Big 4 auditors that are not 
national industry leaders. In comparison to the prior U.K. evidence (Basioudis and Francis, 2007), our 
recent findings suggest that the Big 4 auditors have now managed to successfully market their national 
reputations as industry experts, which was not the case at the beginning of the 21st century.  
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At the city level, there are on average 72 unique city-industry combinations per year where the top-
ranked auditor per industry has an average market share of 68 percent of the fees, which is comparable 
to the earlier findings in the U.K. and U.S. of 68 percent and 69 percent respectively (Basioudis and 
Francis, 2007; Francis et al., 2005).2 The average fee premium for the Big 4 city-specific industry 
leadership averages at 3.98 percent (but it is fading away in our sample with the passing of the years). 
This lower fee premium as compared to the 16 percent in Basioudis and Francis (2007) study suggests 
the diminishing effect of differentiated level of industry expertise between the city-offices of the Big 4 
firms, as it seems the pool of industry expertise is now more centralised and equally shared at the 
national level.  
Overall, our more up-to-date findings support the proposition that in response to the changing and more 
challenging audit environment in the period 2004-2011, the Big 4 audit firms have revised their industry 
specialisation strategy by focusing on establishing firm-wide reputations for industry expertise relative 
to office-level industry expertise, specifically in a country with smaller and centralised economy, like 
the U.K. In doing so, this allows them to achieve positive network externalities across all of their audit 
offices in different locations within the country, thus signal higher quality audit or added-value offered 
through their industry specialisation strategy.  
In the next section, we provide a brief overview of the changing audit environment, a review of prior 
research, as well as the description of the sample, data, and audit fee model that are used in the study. 
This is followed by a discussion of the results of the Big 4 industry leadership tests, as well as various 
sensitivity analyses which are performed to confirm our initial findings. The final part of the paper 
concludes and discusses the implication of the research.  
The Changing Audit Environment 
The U.K. capital market has undergone tremendous changes since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (2002) in the U.S. and following the numerous regulatory reforms by the E.U. and the U.K. 
government. All these developments demonstrate the worldwide concern and increasing demand for a 
more transparent and reliable financial reporting system, for a high quality external audit function and 
for an effective corporate governance structure. For instance, in 2003, the U.K. government’s review of 
the Audit Regulation was carried out in response to the major audit failures and corporate collapses in 
the U.S. at the beginning of the century. The Professional Oversight Board (POB) was later established 
in 2004 by the FRC which is the U.K. independent regulator, and its main arm, the Audit Inspection 
Unit (AIU), was given the responsibility to review the quality of audits performed on the public listed 
companies. In 2005, the adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for all listed 
companies has been made mandatory in the U.K. by the E.U., in an effort to aid the harmonisation of 
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global financial reporting practice and encourage the development of neo-liberal capital markets 
(Hassan et al., 2014). 
Despite the highly regulated audit market, the credibility of the auditing profession has been subject to 
greater scrutiny during and following the period of the GFC which started in the mid-20073, leading, in 
the U.K., to the investigation of the concentration and competition in the Big 4 audit market by the 
House of Lords and the Office of Fair Trading. Audit quality has been a highly debatable topic since 
then, where auditors are particularly argued to be lacking in professional scepticism following the audit 
firms’ failure to detect or prevent corporate collapses from happening (Sikka, 2009). Issues of poor 
governance and risk management exercised by all firms operating in the market for audit services have 
also been put under the spotlight. Reacting to these problems, in 2010, the FRC issued the U.K. 
Corporate Governance Code (revised in 2012 and 2014), the UK Stewardship Code (revised in 2012) 
and the Audit Firm Governance Code (revised in 2016). Also, in 2008, it has been made a statutory 
provision in the U.K. for each of the audit firms to prepare a transparency report annually and which 
discloses information about the audit firm’s legal and governance structures, its internal quality control 
systems, its independence procedures and practices, and certain financial information (TCCAB, 2011). 
More recently, and as the regulatory interventions and changes continue, the E.U. has proposed a 
number of audit reforms, including mandatory audit firm rotation and elimination of non-audit services 
offered by the incumbent external auditor, and these reforms were to be implemented by the member 
states by July 2016. 
Considering the above highlighted litany of regulatory changes and developments, the declining 
financial conditions and the extreme economic uncertainty due to GFC, it follows that the global 
regulatory environment is highly dynamic, adding complexity and risk to every industry including the 
operation and management of the audit firms. As a result, in order for the audit firms to have developed 
a thorough understanding of these and other emerging drivers of change and to prepare for a range of 
possible future scenarios, they may have been forced to consider their business strategies, choice of 
geographic locations, business models and operating structures (Firth, 2002; Srinidhi and Gul, 2007). 
The impact of the GFC alone has caused the largest and sharpest drop in global economic activity and 
instigated governments and regulators to respond swiftly bailing out financial systems and individual 
companies.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that audit firms have differentiated themselves after the GFC transcending 
the traditional boundaries of the profession (Economist, 2013; Chin, 2014). Therefore, the audit firms 
may have modified their industry specialisation strategies as a response to the GFC and the various 
regulatory initiatives that took place in the first decade of the century. Whether the regulatory 
7 
 
interventions, the GFC and the resulting change in audit firms’ structure and market specialisation focus 
had a direct effect on the pricing of audit services is an appealing topic for further research.  
Moreover, as the impact of those changes on all audit firms may not be the same, the responses may 
also not be universal across all audit firms. Changes in the regulatory environment bring together 
challenges for audit firms and their clients, and different organisations may employ different strategies 
in hoping to turn challenges into opportunities. For example, some firms may have responded to 
regulatory changes by providing a differentiated service, others by directing their efforts on building up 
new specialist expertise to serve more clients, and others by investing in technology to carry out the 
audit as efficiently as possible. Trends in the first decade of the century having impacted audit firms in 
different ways, among others, include recruitment and succession planning, competition, offshoring and 
outsourcing. Technology developments have altered how services are delivered by audit firms and audit 
firms have made diverse investments in respect of this (Attolini and Thompson, 2014). A recent case 
involves EY UK that joined PwC and KPMG in securing an alternative business structure licence, 
allowing it to provide legal services in England and Wales.  
 
In the post-Enron environment with the demise of Arthur Andersen and the late banking crisis, the audit 
firms came under intense public scrutiny to respond quickly and restore economic growth through 
building trust. The U.K. regulators have emphasised the importance of good audit firm governance at 
the national level (FRC, 2010). In addition, we argue the rapidly changing global and technology 
dependent economy and increased globalisation of the marketplace, where different players are 
expected to emerge and networks to expand, have probably forced audit firms to shift their focus to 
national-specific (and international-specific) industry knowledge. Given the size, resources, and global 
changes in the economy, it makes sense to assume that there has been some pressure on audit firms to 
promote their national level expertise as opposed to local‐office expertise. 
The prior research on the direct impact of GFC on audit fees is rather limited and provides mixed results. 
A U.K. study by Hassan et al. (2014) shows that audit fees have increased in the five years following 
the mandatory adoption of IFRSs and as a result of the impact of the GFC, suggesting increased audit 
effort. Whilst studies on the impact of the GFC report higher audit fees during the GFC period in 
Australia (Xu et al., 2013) but lower audit fees in the U.S. during the same period (Krishnan and Zhang, 
2013). None of these studies have examined how the auditor’s industry specialisation may have changed 
over the years in terms of its impact on audit pricing. Furthermore, these studies have used shorter 
periods to investigate the association between audit pricing and the GFC, either during the GFC period 
(Krishnan and Zhang, 2013) or during the periods before and during the GFC (Xu et al., 2013). 
Therefore, our study, which covers the period 2004-2011, provides a more comprehensive analysis by 
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covering the pre-GFC (2004-2006), during the GFC (2007-2008), and the post-GFC (2009-2011) 
periods in examining the auditor industry specialisation in the U.K. audit market. 
Auditor Industry Specialisation Research 
The empirical results of previous studies are somehow mixed regarding the impact of industry 
specialisation on audit fees. While many studies generally find a positive relation between auditor 
industry (national) specialisation and audit fees (e.g., Defond et al., 2000; Ferguson et al., 2003; 
Mayhew and Wilkins, 2003; Francis et al., 2005), many others provide somewhat different conclusions. 
For example, Carson and Fargher (2007) find the fee premium to occur only in the large client segment, 
whilst Casterella et al. (2004) reported fee premium in the small client market. Other studies provide 
marginal results or no relation at all (e.g., Palmrose, 1986; Pearson and Trompeter, 1994; Ferguson and 
Stokes, 2002; Basioudis and Francis, 2007); inconclusive evidence (Minutti-Meza, 2013), or even a 
negative relationship/fee discount (e.g., Ettredge and Greenberg, 1990). Overall, many researchers 
recognise that the results are often sensitive to the industry specialisation measures used, and to the 
country and the period analysed (Craswell et al., 1995; Ferguson and Stokes, 2002; Huang et al., 2007; 
Basioudis and Francis, 2007; Causholli et al., 2010; Hay and Jeter, 2011). Therefore, a range of 
sensitivity tests needs to be performed in order for the study’s results to be adequately validated 
(Audousset-Coulier et. al., 2016). 
In addition, the mixed results in prior research could also be explained by the type of strategy pursued 
by the industry specialist. While some industry specialist auditors pursue a product differentiation 
strategy by performing audits in a small proportion of clients in an industry at a premium fee to 
compensate for the higher audit quality offered, some other industry specialists may opt for a cost 
minimisation strategy by auditing a large proportion of clients, competing on price (either lowering 
audit fees or offering fee discounts) at the expense of audit quality (Cahan et al., 2011). It is also possible 
that the benefit from economies of scale from industry specialisation that are passed on by the auditor 
to the client take effect simultaneously such as when the audit fee premium for industry specialisation 
is smaller for auditors with a larger city-industry scale (Fung et al., 2012). Larger and less risky clients 
are also more attracted to purchase audit services from industry specialist auditors in order to fulfil their 
demand for higher audit quality, and whether a fee premium or fee discount results from the auditor 
client negotiations depends very much on the strength of the client’s bargaining power (Casterella et 
al., 2004) and the perceived quality of the differentiated service (industry expertise) offered by the 
auditor (Hay and Jeter, 2011). 
Since Francis et al. (1999) and Reynolds and Francis (2000), audit researchers have started examining 
other possible explanations for the above inconsistent results regarding the influence of industry 
specialisation on audit fees, and in essence, they have focused their attention from the audit firm (firm-
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wide phenomenon) to the specific audit office (office-level or city-level or local phenomenon). This 
stream of research argues that industry expertise is primarily developed through a specialisation at the 
local (city, office) level (Ferguson et al., 2003; Basioudis and Francis, 2007; Carson and Fargher, 2007; 
Hay and Jeter, 2011; Fung et al., 2012; Numan and Willekens, 2012; Minutti-Meza, 2013). Whether 
the audit pricing is dominated by firm-level or office-level industry expertise might explain the strength 
of knowledge sharing and transfer of industry expertise between the particular audit firm city-offices 
(Ferguson et al., 2003). For an audit firm to be priced on its national industry leadership, the market has 
to perceive that standardised level of audit quality exists across all of its national network offices so that 
the firm-level reputation for industry expertise (national industry leadership premium) can be widely 
earned and enjoyed irrespective of the audit office location (Vera-Munoz et al., 2006). On the contrary, 
if industry leadership premium only exists for city-specific industry leaders, this may show that industry 
expertise is a more local phenomenon and that it is closely tied to the audit professional staff who 
service clients in specific cities and industries (Basioudis and Francis, 2007). 
As mentioned earlier, research using the national-city framework introduced by Ferguson et al. (2003) 
produces mixed results. In the U.S. and Australia, auditor’s industry expertise based on joint national 
and office-level reputation matters more in the Big 4 audit market, as they are priced at a higher rate as 
compared to national industry leadership alone or city-specific industry leadership alone at an average 
premium of 18 percent and 24 percent respectively (Ferguson et al., 2003; Francis et al., 2005). While 
there is evidence of a significant fee premium for city-specific industry leadership alone in the U.S., 
industry leadership at the national or city level alone is not priced in the Australian market. On the 
contrary, recent evidence from New Zealand shows that industry specialisation premium for city 
leadership alone is higher than joint national-city leadership (Hay and Jeter, 2011). However, the 
similarity between these three countries is that national industry leadership alone is not priced in the 
audit market.  
The prior U.K. evidence based on 2002-2003 data (Basioudis and Francis, 2007) stands in contrast to 
the U.S. and Australia, but similar to New Zealand by showing that the Big 4 city-specific industry 
leadership alone matters more than the joint national and city-specific industry leadership as it is able 
to earn higher fee premium (19 percent for city-specific industry leadership relative to 12 percent for 
joint national and city-specific industry leadership). Nevertheless, no explanation is provided as why 
this is the case. Also, no significant fee premium is reported for Big 4 national industry leaders relative 
to other Big 4 auditors that are not national industry leaders. The prior U.K. results imply that 
knowledge sharing and transfer in respect of industry expertise does not occur across the city-offices of 
the Big 4 firms in 2002-2003. 
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In this paper, therefore, we examine whether the Big 4 national industry leadership and/or the city-
specific industry leadership commands audit fee premiums in the U.K. during the period 2004-2011, 
and we attempt to determine whether the findings of prior research are still valid, given the various 
regulatory intervention in the market for audit services in the recent years as well as the undoubted 
impact of the GFC.    
Sample, Data, and Audit Fee Model 
The sample comprises of all companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) between the 
financial years 2004 and 2011. We begin our sample in year 2004 so that we could compare our results 
with the prior U.K. study by Basioudis and Francis (2007) which was based on 2002-2003 data, as this 
enable us to examine the progression of the Big 4 industry specialisation strategy in the U.K. audit 
market. Data are collected from FAME4 and Thomson OneBanker databases. As the data on the location 
of the accounting firm’s lead engagement office is not provided in any database, we had to manually 
collect this data from the office-specific letterhead of the audit report in the respective company’s annual 
report in the sample. This data is then used to analyse the city-specific industry leadership, which is 
determined based on the accounting firm’s share of aggregate industry audit fees for each unique city.  
The initial sample comprises of approximately 22,217 companies listed on the LSE, which was screened 
to exclude companies that are not followed by FAME, are in the service providing sectors (i.e., financial 
services, public administration and defence, health and education, other services), and have got 
incomplete financial data5. This process results in a sample of 4,459 observations with complete audit 
fees data that is used to calculate the various auditor industry market shares. However, as this study is 
based on companies with Big 4 auditors only and aims to test if Big 4 industry leaders have a fee 
premium relative to other Big 4 firms who are non-leaders, we exclude the 1,688 non-Big 4 observations 
from the sample, resulting in 2,771 Big 4 observations only. A further 383 observations from the sample 
with less than two city-specific observations per industry are also excluded. This additional screening 
is performed as to ensure that the audit market in all cities in the sample is competitive where more than 
one audit client exists, although similar results would be obtained if the full sample of 2,771 
observations is used. The final sample for this is study is 2,388 observations which represent 53.5 
percent of the full sample with complete data on audit fees. The sample screening process for the final 
sample of 2,388 observations is summarised in Table 1.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
The industry classification used in this study is based on the FAME categorisation of the major industry 
sectors, where the numerous LSE industry codes (SIC codes) of similar industry nature are being 
categorised into only 13 major industry sectors.6 Further, this is the first study on auditor industry 
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leadership that we are aware that uses data covering the pre-, during and post-GFC period. The use of 
three sub-samples would allow us to distinctively examine whether the Big 4 industry specialist auditors 
responded differently to the 2007/2008 GFC in terms of their pricing strategy and market share 
dominance.  
Table 2 reports the sample distribution for the Big 4 audit firms in the pre-, during and post-GFC 
periods. Overall, it can be seen that the average audit fees has significantly increased from £0.85 million 
in the pre-GFC period to £1.11 million in the post-GFC period despite the decrease in the number of 
Big 4 audit clients from 1,063 in the pre-GFC period to 707 in the post-GFC period. The results of the 
independent T-tests indicate that there are significant differences in the average Big 4 audit fees (T-
statistic=1.92, p < .10) between the pre- and post-GFC periods. This supports the findings from a recent 
U.K. study by Hassan et al. (2014) and an Australian study by Xu et al. (2013) which both have also 
shown that audit fees are higher in the post-GFC period, suggesting that the Big 4 auditors responded 
to the GFC by charging higher audit fees to compensate for their increased audit effort.  
Based on the T-test result (T-statistic=2.71, p < .01), it can be observed that the average size of the Big 
4 clients based on total assets is significantly smaller  in the pre-GFC period (£2.4 million) as compared 
to the post-GFC period (£4.2 million) . There is no evidence of significant differences in the Big 4 
average non-audit fees over the periods under examination. Within the Big 4 U.K. audit market, PwC 
is the leading audit firm with the highest number of clients and highest average audit fees, and there 
seems to be a significant increase in the average audit fees (T-statistic=2.30, p < .05) and client’s total 
assets (T-statistic=2.76, p < .01) of PwC in the post-GFC as compared to the pre-GFC period. 
Interestingly, Ernst & Young is the audit firm with the lowest number of clients but has got a higher 
average audit and non-audit fees charged to its clients when compared with Deloitte and KPMG. 
Relative to other Big 4 firms, a significant drop in non-audit fees is only evident for KPMG in the post-
GFC period (T-statistic=2.21, p < .05). 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Additional analysis of audit market concentration for the period 2004-2011 reveals that on average 44 
percent of companies from our sample are audited by London offices of the Big 4 firms, and paid an 
annual average 82 percent of the sample audit fees. Similarly, 33 percent of the companies in the sample 
are headquartered in London, with only 53 percent of them are audited in London itself. Similar to 
Basioudis and Francis (2007), it seems that the audit market in the U.K. continues to be dominated by 
London.7 Given the smaller geographical size of the U.K. relative to countries like the U.S. and 
Australia, and the position of London as the primary commercial centre, it may seem logical to assume 
that industry expertise in the U.K. may more likely to be driven by the firm’s total client base (national 
clientele) rather than city-specific expertise based on office-specific clienteles. 
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Our primary analysis is based on all companies in the sample with Big 4 auditors and tests if Big 4 
industry leaders have a fee premium relative to other Big 4 non-leaders. The reduced sample of 2,388 
observations for the Big 4 industry leadership test comprises of on average 24 unique cities and 72 
unique city-industry combinations per year over the period examined. The average of four observations 
per city-industry combination is similar to Basioudis and Francis (2007).  
In order to apply the national-city framework developed by Ferguson et al. (2003) to our analysis, we 
have partitioned the Big 4 industry specialist auditor observations into the following variables 
specification:   
(1) indicator variable NAT, 1 = companies audited by the Big 4 national industry leaders (N = 830), 
0 = otherwise; 
(2) indicator variable CITY, 1 = companies audited by the Big 4 city-specific industry leaders (N = 
1,085), 0 = otherwise; 
(3) indicator variable JOINT, 1 = companies audited by auditors that are joint (both) the national 
industry leader and the city-specific industry leader (N = 657), 0 = otherwise; 
(4) indicator variable CITY_ONLY, 1 = companies audited by the city-specific industry leader alone, 
without also being the national industry leader (N = 428), 0 = otherwise;  
(5) indicator variable NAT_ONLY, 1 = companies audited by the national industry leader alone, 
without also being the city-specific industry leader (N = 173), 0 = otherwise. 
The last three indicator variables above are used to control explicitly for the joint effect of national and 
city-specific industry leadership, which is the primary focus of the analysis.   
In other words, companies with auditors that are national industry leaders NAT (N = 830) can be 
decomposed into those audited by national leaders alone NAT_ONLY (N = 173), plus those whose 
auditors are joint national and city-specific industry leaders JOINT (N = 657). Similarly, companies 
with auditors that are city-specific industry leaders CITY (N = 1,085) can be decomposed into those 
audited by city-specific industry leaders alone CITY_ONLY (N = 428), plus those auditors that are 
jointly national and city-specific industry leaders JOINT (N = 657). The purpose of these three partitions 
is to test for the separate effects of national and city-specific industry leadership, as well as to isolate 
the joint effect of national and city-specific industry leadership on audit pricing.  
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3 for the full Big 4 sample (N = 2,388), the clients of the Big 
4 joint national and city-specific industry leaders JOINT (N = 657), the Big 4 city-specific industry 
leaders but not national industry leaders CITY_ONLY (N = 428), and clients of the Big 4 national 
industry leaders but not city-specific industry leaders NAT_ONLY (N = 173).  Comparing between the 
different samples, clients of the Big 4 joint national and city-specific industry leaders (JOINT) are 
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slightly larger in size (LTA), have higher audit complexity (SQRTSUBS), pay relatively higher audit 
fees (LAF), are more profitable (ROI), have lower liquidity risk (QUICK) and higher leverage (DE). 
The clients of the Big 4 city-specific industry leaders but not national industry leaders (CITY_ONLY) 
make more losses (LOSS) compared to the other Big 4 industry leaders. Whereas the clients of the Big 
4 national industry leaders but not city-specific industry leaders (NAT_ONLY) receive fewer modified 
audit reports (OPINION), pay relatively higher non-audit fees (LNAF), have higher audit risk (CATA) 
and lower initial audit engagements (INITIAL). The remaining variables (LONDON, CATA, FOREIGN, 
BUSY, INITIAL) are comparable across the specialty auditor groups. An independent sample t-test 
indicates there is no significant difference between the mean of LAF for the Big 4 city-industry leaders 
only and the Big 4 national industry leaders only (F-statistic = 0.87, p >.10).  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
Table 4 presents the correlation matrix for all the variables examined in the study. The variable JOINT 
is highly correlated with NAT and CITY at 0.84 and 0.67 respectively, which is expected as JOINT is 
the interactive effect between NAT and CITY variables. Correlations between the dependent and the 
independent variables are as expected and no correlations above 0.70 are present among the control 
variables.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
Audit Fee Model 
We adopt the same audit fee model as used in previous studies (for example, Basioudis and Francis, 
2007; Francis et al., 2005) to estimate the audit fee premium for industry leadership, as this model has 
a strong explanatory power and has been proven to be robust across different samples, countries and 
time periods. The audit fee model is estimated as the industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects model 
to control for systematic differences in fees across the 13 industries and eight years period examined in 
the sample. An industry fixed-effects model controls for potential omitted variables in case there are 
any systematic differences across industries and years with respect to client’s company size, risk or 
audit complexity that are associated to audit fees (Basioudis and Francis, 2007). We specify the ordinary 
least-squares (OLS) regression model as follows: 
 
where: 
LAF   = natural log of audit fees in GBP’000; 
LTA   = natural log of total assets in GBP’000; 
εAUDITORβINITIALβLONDONβ
LNAFβLOSSβBUSYβOPINIONβFOREIGNβ
ROIβDEβQUICKβCATAβSQRTSUBSβLTAβαLAF
141312
1110987
654321



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SQRTSUBS  = square root of total subsidiaries; 
CATA   = ratio of current assets to total assets; 
QUICK  = ratio of current assets (less inventories) to current liabilities; 
DE   = ratio of long-term debt to total assets; 
ROI   = ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets; 
FOREIGN  = proportion of total sales from foreign operations; 
OPINION  = indicator variable, 1 = qualified or going concern audit report; 0 = otherwise; 
BUSY   = indicator variable, 1 = December 31st or March 31st year-end, 0 = otherwise; 
LOSS   = indicator variable, 1 = loss in any of the past three years, 0 = otherwise; 
LNAF   = natural log of non-audit fees (in GBP’000) paid to the incumbent auditor; 
LONDON  = indicator variable, 1 = London-based company, 0 = otherwise; 
INITIAL  = indicator variable, 1 = new auditor in the current or prior year, 0 = otherwise;  
AUDITOR      = experimental indicator variable, 1 = industry specialist auditor (using the various 
specifications as described earlier), 0 = otherwise; 
Ɛ  = error term. 
The 13 control variables used in the model above are the standard audit fee control variables used in 
the audit fee models in previous studies. Consistent with prior research (Whisenant et al., 2003; Francis 
et al., 2005; Basioudis and Francis, 2007; Choi et al., 2010), higher fees are expected for large size 
clients (LTA), for clients with greater audit complexity (SQRTSUBS and FOREIGN) and greater audit 
risk (CATA, DE, and LOSS), for London-based companies (LONDON) due to higher living costs 
experienced in London, for modified audit reports (OPINION) due to more investigative efforts in such 
circumstances, when the incumbent external auditor provides non-audit services to the client (LNAF), 
and during the busy seasons (BUSY) for the auditor. Lower fees are expected for higher values of the 
risk variables QUICK and ROI, as clients with a larger QUICK ratio are less risky (and more liquid) 
and, therefore, expected to have smaller audit fees. More profitable clients (with higher ROI) pose less 
risk to the auditor, resulting also in lower fees. Also, lower fees are expected due to lowballing effects 
if an audit represents the first or second year of engagement (INITIAL). Finally, the coefficient of the 
AUDITOR variable represents the magnitude of the fee premium under different definitions of industry 
specialist auditor as explained earlier and is further explained in the next section.  
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National and City-Specific Industry Leadership Tests 
The sample comprises 2,388 observations over the period 2004-2011 and three models test if Big 4 
industry leaders (defined in various ways) have higher fees than other Big 4 auditors in a period of 
major regulatory interventions and changing economic conditions. The models are estimated using the 
three specifications as used in Ferguson et al. (2003). Model 1 tests the effect of national-level industry 
leadership per se (NAT) on differential Big 4 audit pricing for N = 830 observations in which the Big 4 
auditor is the national industry leader, and the default comparison group is all of the remaining 1,558 
observations not having Big 4 national industry leaders. Model 2 tests the effect of city-specific 
leadership per se (CITY) for N = 1,085 observations in which the Big 4 auditor is the city-specific 
industry leader, and the default comparison group is the remaining 1,303 observations not audited by 
city-specific industry leaders.  
Relatively to Model 1 and Model 2, Model 3 is the primary model of interest because it controls 
explicitly for the joint effect of national and city-specific industry leadership through the use of three 
auditor indicator variables, that is: Big 4 auditors that are jointly national and city-specific industry 
leaders JOINT (N = 657); Big 4 auditors that are city-specific industry leaders but are not national 
industry leaders CITY_ONLY (N = 428); and Big 4 auditors that are national industry leaders but are 
not city-specific industry leaders NAT_ONLY  (N = 173). The default comparison group is the Big 4 
auditors that are neither national nor city-specific industry leaders (N = 1,130). 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
Results of the three model estimations are reported in Table 5. Significance levels for model coefficients 
are reported as two-tailed p-values. All models are significant at p < .0001 with adjusted R-squares of 
around 86 percent. Except for DE, all control variables are significant at p < .01 and in the expected 
direction, while the variables, OPINION and INITIAL, are insignificant at p > .10.  
Model 1 tests the effect of the national industry leadership on audit pricing, without controlling for the 
joint national and city-specific industry leadership, and the auditor indicator variable NAT is found to 
be positive and significant (p < .01). The coefficient value is 0.055 which equates to an average audit 
fee premium of 5.65 percent.8 This result is in contrast to the only previous U.K. study by Basioudis 
and Francis (2007) where no significant audit fee premium for Big 4 national industry leadership is 
documented for the top-ranked national industry leader, but provides an important indication that the 
national-specific industry expertise has gained significant investment in the period under examination. 
Model 2 tests the effect of city-specific industry leadership on audit pricing, without controlling for the 
joint national and city-specific industry leadership effect. The auditor indicator variable CITY is positive 
and significant (p < .01). The coefficient value is 0.039 which equates to an average audit fee premium 
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of 3.98 percent.9 This fee premium is three times lower as compared to prior U.K. finding by Basioudis 
and Francis (2007) of 16 percent. This result confirms the restructuring of the industry specialisation 
that has happened in the U.K. since 2002 by diminishing the focus on the city specialisation and perhaps 
refocusing on the national industry specialisation.10  
Interestingly, Model 3, which is the model of interest and controls for the joint effect of national and 
city-specific industry leadership shows that neither the national industry leadership alone (NAT_ONLY) 
nor the city-specific industry leadership alone (CITY_ONLY) results in a significant fee premium (p > 
.10). Instead, a fee premium for industry leadership is only earned by the city-specific industry leaders 
if and when they are also national industry leaders. The coefficient for the joint national and city-specific 
industry leadership (JOINT) is 0.069 (p < .01) which represents a premium of 7.14 percent.  
The above findings differ somehow from Basioudis and Francis (2007) who report a larger and 
significant fee premium when the auditor is a city-specific industry leader alone (19 percent) compared 
to when the auditor is a joint national and city-specific industry leader (12 percent). In contrast, our 
overall results for the full period of 2004-2011 indicate that the premium for industry leadership in the 
U.K. is no longer driven by the office-level industry expertise as shown previously in Basioudis and 
Francis (2007) using 2002-2003 data. Our U.K. evidence of fee premium for industry leadership is also 
in contrast to the U.S. where a significant premium is documented for both the joint national and city 
leadership as well as the city-specific industry leadership alone (Francis et al., 2005). Also, the evidence 
presented in this paper stands in contrast to New Zealand where city-specific industry leadership plays 
a more important role than joint national and city industry leadership (Hay and Jeter, 2011). Instead, 
this new U.K. evidence is rather similar to Australia (Ferguson et al., 2003) where a fee premium only 
exists for the joint national and city-specific industry leaders (despite being comparably lower in the 
UK at 7.14 per cent versus 24 per cent in Australia). Office-level industry expertise seems to play a 
more important role in Australia as the national leadership rankings are driven by the specific offices 
where the audit firms are city leaders. However, it seems that this is not the case in the U.K. where 
national industry leadership appears to play a more important role, based on the evidence of a marginally 
higher fee premium for national industry leaders per se (5.65 percent as reported in Model 1) relative 
to city-specific industry leaders per se (3.98 percent as reported in Model 2). 
This new evidence from the U.K. implies that the Big 4 auditor industry specialisation at the national 
(firm-wide) level and city-specific (office) level both have simultaneously an impact on audit pricing, 
and therefore, neither perception alone should be considered sufficient in explaining the existence and 
magnitude of a fee premium for industry expertise. The new evidence also implies that market shares 
and industry specialisation are evolving replacing old ones in order for the audit firms to compete more 
effectively and efficiently.11 It also confirms the initial intuition discussed earlier in the paper that the 
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various changes in regulations and technology, the GFC, and national and worldwide integration of 
markets and competition have influenced the specialisation strategies of the audit firms from the city-
specific industry expertise to the national-specific industry expertise. Overall, our results shed further 
light to auditor industry leadership phenomenon in the U.K. by documenting evidence of knowledge 
sharing across the Big 4 city offices, which was not prevalent in the beginning of the 21st century.  
Test on the Effect of Financial Crisis on Auditor Industry Specialisation 
In this section, we examined whether the GFC have had a direct effect on the fee premium on the Big 
4 industry leaders. Results of the analysis are presented in Table 6. The same regression analysis is run 
for the pre-, during and post-GFC periods separately to determine whether there is any differential 
effects on the documented fee premium earned by the Big 4 industry leaders relative to the other Big 4 
non-leaders. The full Big 4 sample (N = 2,388) is partitioned into the pre-GFC period of 2004-2006 (N 
= 1,063), the GFC period of 2007-2008 (N = 618), and the post-GFC period of 2009-2011 (N = 707). 
All the regressions are valid with R-squares between 85.3 and 88.1 percent.  
Results for the pre-GFC period seem to be consistent with the results in the post-GFC period, where 
significant fee premium is reported for the national industry leader (NAT) and city-specific industry 
leader (CITY) respectively in Model 1 and Model 2. Also, in Model 3, only the joint national and city-
specific industry leaders (JOINT) earn fee premiums, but no evidence of the city specific industry 
leaders alone (CITY_ONLY) or the national industry leaders alone (NAT_ONLY) being able to charge 
fee premiums. Taken together, the findings from the pre- and post-GFC periods are consistent with the 
main findings reported in Table 5 earlier. Nevertheless, the coefficient for the fee premiums seems to 
be higher in the post-GFC period as compared to the pre-GFC period across all the three regression 
models examined. 
On the other hand, during the GFC period of 2007-2008, it can be seen that there is no evidence of a 
significant fee premium for auditor industry leadership either at the national or city-specific industry 
level (the JOINT coefficient is slightly significant at one-tail, p < .10). This finding suggests that the 
financial crisis did have an effect on the auditor industry specialisation strategy or fee premium. The 
finding is interesting as it indicates that the audit firms were careful in upsetting the market further 
given they were partially blamed for the GFC.  
Alternatively, we have also run the regression analysis using year dummies for the GFC and post-GFC 
periods and using the total sample of 2,388 companies for the whole period 2004-2011, and the findings 
(not tabulated) seem consistent with the main findings in Table 5 earlier. In addition, the year period 
dummies are positive and significant suggesting an increase in audit fees during the GFC and post-GFC 
periods. 
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[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
We have further analysed the average market shares of the industry specialist auditors in the pre-, during 
and post-GFC periods respectively. The (untabulated) analysis shows that the average market share of 
the national industry leaders (NAT) has significantly increased from 47 percent in the pre-GFC period 
to 60 percent in the post-GFC period (T-statistic=12.65, p < .01). This confirms our earlier suggestion 
that emphasis has been placed on the national-specific industry expertise during the period under 
examination, which implies that the sharing and transferability of industry expertise knowledge and 
skills between the city offices of the Big 4 audit firms has increased over the recent years.  
At the city-industry level, the average market share of the city-specific industry leaders (CITY) seems 
to have decreased considerably during the GFC period of 2007/2008 to 63 percent from 67 percent in 
the pre-GFC period before starting to go up again in the post-GFC period to 69 percent. However, based 
on the T-test result, there seems to be no significant differences in the average market share of the city-
specific industry leaders between the pre-and post-GFC periods (T-statistic=1.42, p > .10).  
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the average number of city-industry combinations has dropped from 
79 in the pre financial crisis period, to 72 during the financial crisis period and subsequently to 64 in 
the post financial crisis period. There are three possible explanations for the continuing decrease in the 
average number of city-industry combinations, either 1) there is lesser number of Big 4 audit offices 
operating in different cities, or 2) there is lesser number of industries in which the individual Big 4 city 
offices choose to specialise, or finally 3) both of the above are present simultaneously. These 
interpretations can also be read in conjunction with the fact that a large number of listed companies 
were delisted from the LSE during and after the GFC.  
Sensitivity and Robustness Tests 
Alternative industry classification scheme as per Basioudis and Francis (2007) 
Basioudis and Francis (2007) categorised the industries based on LSE’s two-digit SIC codes. To check 
whether our results are robust across a different industry classification scheme, we reclassified our 
sample into 25 industry categories, based on the LSE two-digit SIC codes and as used in Basioudis and 
Francis (2007), and re-performed the same analysis as in Table 5. Under the two-digit SIC Codes 
industry classification, there are N = 880 companies with Big 4 auditors who are national industry 
leaders NAT, which can be decomposed into those audited by Big 4 national leaders alone NAT_ONLY 
(N = 548), plus those whose Big 4 auditors who are joint national and city-specific industry leaders 
JOINT (N = 332). While there are N = 616 companies with Big 4 auditors who are city-specific industry 
leaders CITY that can be decomposed into those audited by city-specific industry leaders alone 
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CITY_ONLY (N = 284), plus those Big 4 auditors that are jointly national and city-specific industry 
leaders JOINT (N = 332).  
In untabulated results, we obtain qualitatively similar results in Model 3 as reported earlier in Table 5, 
where the industry leadership coefficient is only significant for the Big 4 joint national and city leaders 
JOINT (averages at 7.90 percent). While the fee premiums for national industry leaders NAT in Model 
1 and city-specific industry leaders CITY in Model 2 are comparable at 3.46 percent and 3.98 percent 
respectively.  
Next, we partition the results into yearly regression to examine the stability of the measures during the 
period examined and explain why our results are different from the previous U.K. study by Basioudis 
and Francis (2007). Again, unreported evidence shows that the results for the year 2004 (which is the 
first year of analysis after the Basioudis and Francis (2007) study) seem to be very similar to this prior 
study, except that the coefficient for the Big 4 joint national and city leaders (JOINT) in Model 3 is only 
significant at one-tailed test.  
For the years 2005-2011, the results start showing different patterns per individual year. There is no 
evidence of a fee premium at all in year 2005, followed by evidence of fee discount (one-tailed test) in 
year 2006 provided by the Big 4 city-specific industry leader alone (CITY_ONLY). In year 2007, the 
Big 4 national industry leadership (NAT) becomes dominant as the variable is significant in Model 1 
and the Big 4 national industry leader alone (NAT_ONLY) variable in Model 3 is also significant (one-
tailed test). The city-specific industry premium documented earlier in Basioudis and Francis (2007) 
seems to be diminishing slowly, as there is still a slightly significant coefficient in 2004 and then it is 
completely wiped out in the following few years (at the 1% level of significance) until it appears again 
in year 2008.From the year 2008 onwards, both the Big 4 city-specific industry leader (CITY) in Model 
2 and the Big 4 joint national and city leader (JOINT) in Model 3 are significant (one-tailed test), and 
the Big 4 national industry leader (NAT) variable also becomes significant in years 2010 and 2011 (with 
higher coefficients than the Big 4 city-specific industry leader CITY).  
The significant diverse findings obtained when the 2004-2011 full sample is partitioned across different 
sample years suggest that statistical evidence obtained from a sample of one single year can be perhaps 
misleading and risky to be used for generalisation purposes (Audousset-Coulier et al., 2016). 
Alternative regression estimator 
While the OLS regression estimators with White (1980) robust standard errors are consistent in the 
presence of heteroscedasticity, it has been argued that its standard errors could be biased or produce 
mis-specified test-statistics (either over- or under-estimating the true variability of the coefficient 
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estimates) when either time series or cross sectional dependence is present (Gow et al., 2010, p. 487; 
Petersen, 2009). Thus, we have re-estimated all the main regression models in Table 5 using cluster 
robust standard error which cluster for firm dimension. The test results (not tabulated) provide 
qualitatively similar findings as reported in the main regression analyses in Table 5. 
Individual auditors and industries   
We  also  test  whether  results  reported  in  Table  5  are  driven  by  individual  Big  4  audit  firms  or 
individual industries. Following Francis et al. (2005), first, we re-estimated all the models in Table 5 
by dropping each of the Big 4 audit firms. Next,  we re-estimated  the  models  by  dropping  each  of  
the  13  industries.  The findings (not tabulated) are qualitatively the same as in Table 5, which indicates 
that the Big 4 firms and individual industries do not drive the results. 
Eliminate the effect of monopoly pricing in the market of city-specific industries 
Our sample screening process stipulates a minimum of two observations per unique city-industry 
combination as to ensure that there is a competitive audit market in presence (N = 2,388). However, a 
city-specific industry may still be uncompetitive if all the companies in that particular industry in that 
particular city are audited by the same auditor, as this indicates monopoly pricing by a single auditor. 
Hence, in order to eliminate such effect from our main results, we delete a further 89 observations from 
36 city-industry combinations, which reduces the sample size to 2,299 observations. As shown in Table 
7, the results are qualitatively the same as in Table 5 when re-estimated on this reduced sample. 
Alternative definition of auditor industry leadership 
We further test whether our results are robust to alternative different definitions of auditor industry 
leadership found in prior studies. First, we adopt the alternative market share cut-off approach 
introduced by Neal and Riley (2004) to define the Big 4 industry specialists. In order to apply Neal and 
Riley’s formula to the city level, we follow Reichelt and Wang (2010) approach where rather than using 
the number of Big N auditors, we use the average number of auditors per city-industry combination. 
This is because there are fewer auditors in a city-industry combination and non-Big N firms can also be 
specialists at the city level. On average, there are 2.5 auditors per city industry market, which computes 
to 48 percent (1.2 X 1/2.5), or approximately 50 percent. Thus, using this approach, a national (city) 
industry specialist is designated to the audit firms where the auditor has a market share greater than 30 
percent (50 percent) in a particular industry, within a particular year and city. As the approach requires 
a minimum 30 percent market share for national industry specialists, this allows for multiple auditors 
to be named national industry specialists. On the other hand, it reduces the number of city-specialists 
only to those with a market share exceeding 50 percent, and this is often the case as there is absence of 
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single industry specialist in larger cities like London, Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds as there is 
not normally one Big 4 firms domineering in those markets. As shown in Table 7, the results using this 
alternative market share cut-off is comparable to the main findings reported earlier in Table 5. 
In addition, we also adopt the portfolio approach (Neal and Riley, 2004) as an alternative measure of 
auditor industry leadership. Portfolio approach is different from the market share approach where an 
audit firm is still considered an industry leader in those industries in which they generate the most 
revenue and presumably have invested the most resources into developing industry-specific knowledge, 
even if they do not maintain a leading market share in that industry (Neal and Riley, 2004). Under the 
portfolio approach, we use continuous measure of industry leadership and rerun the regressions for 
Model 1 and Model 2 to test the Big 4 national industry leadership and Big 4 city-specific industry 
leadership separately. In Model 3, we include both the national industry leadership test variable and the 
city-specific industry leadership test variables together in a single model. Based on the untabulated 
results, in Model 1, we find that the Big 4 national industry leader variable is significant at p < .10 
(coefficient = 0.116). In Model 2 the coefficient for city-specific industry leadership variable is not 
significant (p > .10). Whereas in Model 3, we find that the national industry leadership variable is 
significant (coefficient = 0.127, p < .05) but the city-specific industry leadership variable is not 
significant (p > .10).  
Both the results using the alternatives definition of auditor industry leadership in this section support 
our argument and findings in the main analysis earlier that the national industry leadership has gained 
more importance relative to city-specific industry leadership in the post-SOX period in the U.K. 
Effect of potential nonlinearities on company size and audit fees 
We further address the concern that non-linearities and misspecification of company size may drive the 
main results in Table 5. We estimate a regression model here in which the dependent variable is based 
on ranked values of LAF and which may be less sensitive to potential non-linearities than continuous 
values of LAF. In a second regression model, we rank both the dependent variable (LAF) and the size 
variable (LTA) to further mitigate the effects of potential non-linearities between audit fees and 
company size. These two analyses affirm that the joint national and city-specific industry leadership 
(JOINT) results in the highest fee premium and that there is neither a fee premium for national industry 
leadership alone (NAT_ONLY) nor city-specific industry leadership alone (CITY_ONLY), as in Table 5. 
Hence, we conclude that there is no reason to believe that model misspecification or non-linearities with 
respect to company size explain the results in Table 5. 
Auditor industry leadership market share based on clients’ total assets and total sales 
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We further test whether the main findings reported in Table 5 are sensitive to the use of audit fees to 
measure auditor market shares and industry leadership. The market shares of audit firms are recalculated 
based on the clients’ total assets and on clients’ total sales, and the results are presented in Table 7. The 
empirical evidence based on these two alternative market share measures suggests that the fee premium 
for national industry leaders (NAT) in Model 1 remains significant. However, there is no evidence of 
fee premium (p > .10) attached to city-specific industry leaders (CITY) in Model 2, and so this is 
different from the main results in Table 5. In Model 3, we can see that there are still premiums for the 
joint national and city-specific industry leaders (JOINT), but it is interesting that a fee discount is 
reported for the first time for the city-specific industry leaders alone CITY_ONLY (p < .01). The fee 
premium for the joint leaders is lower in the analysis here from all other previous analyses, and possibly 
the discount offered by the city-specific industry leaders alone offsets the higher fee premium charged 
by the joint leaders.  
Sub-samples based on auditee size, risk and growth  
To confirm whether the earlier documented results in Table 5 for the Big 4 sample are robust across 
different sample characteristics, we rerun the same analysis on various sub-samples based on client’s 
size, risk and growth categorisation. The coefficients and the significance level for these tests are 
reported in Table 7.    
To examine the Big 4 industry leadership premium based on the auditee size, we follow Francis et al. 
(2005) by splitting the Big 4 sample (N = 2,388) into two equal sub-samples based on the median 
absolute value for total assets of GBP£241.9 million. The large client segment and small client segment 
each has N = 1,194 observations respectively. The evidence of fee premium for both the large and small 
client segments are consistent with the main findings in Table 5, with higher fee premium reported for 
the large relative to small clients of the Big 4 audit market.    
To examine whether there are differentiated premiums for industry expertise between the high risk and 
low risk auditor clients, we follow prior research on auditor independence (Geiger and Raghunandan 
2001, Geiger and Rama 2003; Basioudis et al., 2008), and define risk as the probability of client being 
financially distressed. We determine a financial distress company using the probability of bankruptcy 
model introduced by Hopwood et al. (1994) and modified by Geiger and Raghunandan (2001)12. The 
Big 4 sample is equally divided into a sub-sample of high risk and low risk clients (N = 1,194 
respectively) based on the median value of the probability of bankruptcy score which is 0.49. As shown 
in Table 7, the audit fee premium for national industry leadership (NAT) is higher for high risk clients 
while the premium for city-specific industry leadership (CITY) is higher for low risk client. Both in the 
high risk and low risk client’s segments, we find that the premium for joint national and city-specific 
industry leader (JOINT) is comparable between the large and small client, while there are no fee 
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premiums reported for national industry leader alone (NAT_ONLY) and city-specific industry leader 
alone (CITY_ONLY), as in Table 5. 
Finally, using the market to book ratio as the proxy of auditor client’s growth (Carcello and Nagy, 
2004), we split our Big 4 sample into a sub-sample of high growth and low growth clients (N = 1,194 
respectively) based on the median value of the market to book ratio for the Big 4 sample (0.89). As 
shown in Table 7, the fee premiums for city-specific industry leadership (CITY) and joint national and 
city-specific industry leadership (JOINT) are higher for low growth clients as compared to high growth 
clients. The fee premium for national industry leadership (NAT) is comparable between the high and 
low growth companies. These results are comparable to our main results in Table 5. 
 [INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
National industry leader (NIL) vs. non-leader (non-NIL) 
In this paper, a shift of auditor’s specialisation towards expertise at the national level has been proposed, 
and the results obtained so far are in the direction of supporting this argument. In other words, the 
findings of the paper lead to the conclusion that a fee premium for industry leadership is only earned 
by the city-specific industry leaders if and when they are also national industry leaders. 
In this part of the paper, we refine the main test of the study and examine whether the Big 4 national 
industry leaders (NIL) are able to charge directly higher prices against the Big 4 non-leaders (non-NIL). 
We have used a matched-pair design for the analysis in this subsection here in order to better support 
the previously documented effect in this paper of the Big 4 national industry leadership. After having 
identified 830 companies that are audited by the Big 4 national industry leaders in the period 2004-
2011, we treat this sample as the test sample (i.e., the NIL sample). We then matched these 830 Big 4 
NIL clients with those audited by a Big 4 firm who is a non-leader in the same industry. The matching 
to our test sample companies is based on size (net sales and/or total assets), major industry, and year, 
in the order mentioned. These 830 matched companies audited by national industry non-leaders 
comprise our control sample (i.e., the non-NIL sample). We have performed our analyses on the 830 
companies with NILs and the matched 830 companies with non-NILs. This procedure ensured that we 
included similar companies with respect to company size, type of industry, and year in our experimental 
and control samples for analysis. It also provides direct support towards the effect of Big 4 industry 
expertise at national level.  
The model coefficient results (untabulated) for the variable of interest indicate that the magnitude of 
national industry leader variable (NAT) is significantly positively associated (p < .01) with audit pricing 
for the full sample, and the pre- and post-GFC periods. During the GFC period, the results are weakly 
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positive and significant (p = 0.088, one-tail), indicating some diminishing premiums in this period. 
Overall, our regression results suggest that companies audited by Big 4 national industry leaders (NILs) 
pay higher amounts of audit fees than companies audited by Big 4 non-leaders (non-NILs). We can 
conclude, therefore, that the trend of the results observed in this sensitivity analysis section is also 
observed here in this more refined analysis. In other words, the test results here confirm the significance 
of the Big 4 national industry expertise in the period 2004-2011 in the U.K.  
Summary 
On the whole, the sensitivity tests above provide strong evidence of a fee premium for Big 4 firms who 
are joint national and city-specific industry leaders in the U.K. in the period 2004-2011. This fee 
premium appears clearly to be driven by the national industry leaders and is consistently significant 
when tested using alternative industry classification scheme, alternative definition of auditor industry 
leadership, dropping uncompetitive audit markets, in different sub-samples based on the client’s size, 
risk and growth categorisation, and when using total assets and total sales as alternative measures of 
market shares. National industry leadership alone and city-specific industry leadership alone do not 
result in any fee premium, with the exception for the small client segment, where there is evidence of a 
significant fee premium for city-specific industry leadership alone. Based on the findings of this study, 
there is, it seems, a clear progression from Big 4 city-specific industry expertise to Big 4 national-
specific expertise in the U.K. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
In an increasingly competitive market, audit service provision and development has to be continuous to 
ensure services meet the ever-demanding needs of regulators and stakeholders. Furthermore, in a period 
of significant regulatory initiatives and declining financial conditions due to GFC, someone would 
expect to see a major effort by audit firms to develop a thorough understanding of these and other 
emerging drivers of change. Hence, it is expected that audit firms may have been forced to consider 
their business strategies, business models and operating structures (Firth, 2002, Srinidhi and Gul, 2007), 
and may have modified their industry specialisation strategies. In essence, it is expected that the audit 
firms may have reengineered their activities in order to be able to provide more effective audit services 
and increase the confidence in the auditors' performance. Effectively, audit firms may have invested 
into shifting gradually their focus and specialisation from the city-level to national level, in order to be 
able to survive in the highly competitive and concentrated market for audit services.  
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of Big 4 industry specialisation on the pricing of 
audit services in the U.K. in a period of various regulatory interventions and declining economic 
conditions due to GFC. We have used a sample from the U.K. for the period 2004-2011, and the 
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empirical evidence indicates that the audit fee premium for the Big 4 industry leadership is only earned 
by the city-specific industry leaders if and when they are also national industry leaders, and that neither 
the national industry leader alone nor the city-specific industry leader alone is priced anymore in the 
U.K. audit market during the period under investigation. Our findings are also robust to alternative 
industry classification scheme, alternative definition of auditor industry leadership, dropping 
uncompetitive audit markets, in different sub-samples based on the client’s size, risk and growth 
categorisation, and when using total assets and total sales as alternative measures of market shares. 
Further, given the various regulatory developments in the first decade of this century, the corresponding 
changes in the audit environment, and the effect of the GFC on the specialisation strategies of audit 
firms, our study has also examined the response of the Big 4 industry specialist auditors to the GFC as 
compared to the pre- and post-GFC periods. Hence, our study has seeked to test whether different 
conclusions can be drawn in the period after the GFC (i.e., the period 2009-2011) as compared to the 
U.K. evidence in prior periods. When the sample is split into three sub-periods (the pre-GFC, during 
the GFC and the post-GFC period), the empirical results confirm the main results of the study that the 
Big 4 audit firms are able to collect audit fee premiums when they are only designated as joint national 
and city-specific industry leaders across all three sub-periods. The fee premiums seem to be larger in 
the GFC period and in the post-GFC period, as compared to the pre-GFC period.  
The study’s results imply that auditor industry leadership at the national (firm-wide) level and city-
specific (office) level both have an impact on audit pricing in the U.K in 2004-2011, suggesting that 
market shares and industry specialties are evolving replacing old ones in order for the audit firms to 
compete more effectively and efficiently. It appears, therefore, that the Big 4 audit firms have revised 
their industry specialisation strategies by focusing on establishing firm-wide reputations for industry 
expertise relative to office-level industry expertise that was documented in the earlier study of Basioudis 
and Francis (2007). From the demand side of the market, this shows that the U.K. market now perceives 
the Big 4 industry expertise is only credible when the auditor is jointly the national industry leader and 
the city-specific industry leader, and that this credibility is valued and priced in the audit market relative 
to national or city-specific industry leadership alone.  
This study has several implications for regulators and investors. Research on fee premium for auditor 
industry specialisation, particularly using the national-city framework, provides an indication on how 
widely industry expertise has been distributed within the Big 4 audit firms at the national and city level. 
Such research informs the regulators and investors on the effectiveness of the auditor industry 
specialisation strategy and the differential effect of industry expertise (firm wide and office-specific) 
on auditor’s remuneration. Also, empirical evidence from another country is helpful in determining if 
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the city versus national framework is pertinent to understanding Big 4 reputations and if this framework 
may have changed due to the regulatory changes and the impact of the GFC.  
Given that there is absence of a study that examines the impact of these recent period developments on 
the Big 4 differentiation strategy through industry specialisation, our study contributes to the 
understanding of how the regulatory changes and the impact of the GFC may have affected the pricing 
of audit services provided by industry specialists. Furthermore, given that our study in the U.K. has 
documented different findings compared to the evidence at the beginning of the century, it may be 
worthwhile for similar studies to be carried out in other countries using data from the period affected 
by the GFC to see whether the findings reported earlier in those countries still hold, whether audit firm 
specialisations last over time and whether audit fee premiums are allocated to different specialisation 
over time.   
Besides that, whether national and/or city-specific dimensions of auditor industry expertise have a 
differential effect on corporate earnings quality has yet to be empirically examined in the U.K. This 
research question is important given that evidence from the U.S. shows that clients of the Big 4 firms 
who are joint national and city-specific industry leaders have lower discretionary accruals, lower 
likelihood of meeting or beating analysts' earnings forecasts by one cent per share and higher likelihood 
of being issued a going-concern audit opinion as compared to clients of national industry leader alone 
or city-specific industry leader alone (Reichelt and Wang, 2010).   
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TABLE 1 
Selection Procedures for the Final Big 4 Sample 
Description     Pooled 
All LSE listed firms     22,217 
Less: Financial firms     (3,456) 
Less: Firms not followed by FAME database, public administration and defence,       
         health and education, other services firms, and firms with incomplete financial data   (14,302) 
 
Full sample with complete data on audit fees  
     
4,459 
Less: Non-Big 4 sample     (1,688) 
Big 4 sample     2,771 
Less: Sample with less than two observations per city-industry combination     (383) 
Final Big 4 sample      2,388 
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TABLE 2 
Sample Distribution based on the Pre, During and Post Financial Crisis Periods (N = 2,388) 
 Pre financial crisis 
2004-2006 (N = 1,063) 
 During financial crisis 
2007-2008 (N = 618) 
 Post financial crisis 
2009-2011 (N =707) 
 
T-Test 
Mean Differences 
between 
Pre and Post 
financial crisis 
periods 
  
 
No. of 
clients 
(N) 
Average   
 
No. of 
clients 
(N) 
Average   
 
No. of 
clients 
(N) 
Average  
 Client’s 
total 
assets 
(£ mil) 
Audit 
fees 
(£ mil) 
Non-
audit 
fees 
(£ mil) 
 Client’s 
total 
assets 
(£ mil) 
Audit 
fees 
(£ mil) 
Non-
audit 
fees 
(£ mil) 
 Client’s 
total 
assets 
(£ mil) 
Audit 
fees 
(£ mil) 
Non-
audit 
fees 
(£ mil) 
 
BIG 4 1,063     618     707      
  2,423     3,311     4,254               2.71*** 
   0.854     0.984     1.110              1.92* 
    0.815     0.662     0.603             1.51 
PwC 341     181     212      
  3,332     5,490     7,609               2.76*** 
   1.137     1.524     1.845              2.30** 
    0.982     0.976     0.936             0.27 
DE     279     171     180      
  1,818     2,098     1,583               0.30 
   0.518     0.651     0.621              1.03 
    0.521     0.411     0.424             1.01 
KPMG 288     166     196      
                 
  1,482     1,452     1,610               0.31 
   0.669     0.598     0.605              0.56 
    0.549     0.429     0.356             2.21** 
EY 155     100     119      
                 
  3,263     4,527     6,671              1.31 
   1.183     1.218     1.372             0.36 
    1.456     0.910     0.685            0.97 
*** significant at p < .01, ** significant at p < .05 and * significant at p < .10 respectively.  
Definition of Big Accounting Firms: 
PWC = PricewaterhouseCoopers; DE = Deloitte & Touche; KP = KPMG; EY = Ernst & Young    
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 TABLE 3 
 Descriptive Statistics for the Sample Data and for the Period 2004-2011 
 Big 4 Sample (N = 2,388)  JOINT Sample (N = 657) 
 Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Q1  Q3 
Q3Q 
 Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Q1  Q3      
LAF      5.419       5.319        0.635        4.954        5.845   5.639   5.477   0.684   5.121   6.204  
LTA      8.444       8.384        0.940        7.761        9.126   8.739   8.716   1.013   7.941   9.523  
SQRTSUBS      5.259       4.060        4.001        2.450        6.856   5.851   4.360   4.439   2.828   7.810  
CATA      0.467       0.461        0.233        0.293        0.625   0.434   0.438   0.219   0.260   0.590  
QUICK      2.093       1.132        4.106        0.771        1.755   1.636   1.023   3.500   0.665   1.480  
DE      0.179       0.144        0.174        0.010        0.290   0.197   0.180   0.173   0.037   0.308  
ROI      0.039       0.070        0.208        0.010        0.126   0.057   0.075   0.182   0.020   0.127  
FOREIGN      0.316       0.050        0.389             0          0.726   0.292   0.041   0.376   0   0.642  
OPINION      0.044             0          0.204             0               0     0.040   0   0.195   0   0  
BUSY      0.657       1.000        0.475             0          1.000   0.656   1.000   0.475   0   1.000  
LOSS      0.297             0          0.457             0          1.000   0.399   0   0.490   0   1.000  
LNAF      4.929       5.170        1.436        4.610        5.725   4.985   5.155   1.280   4.602   5.720  
LONDON      0.363             0          0.481             0          1.000   0.335   0   0.472   0   1.000  
INITIAL      0.329             0          0.470             0          1.000   0.338   0   0.473   0   1.000  
    
  CITY_ONLY Sample (N = 428)  NAT_ONLY Sample (N = 173) 
 Mean  Median  Std. Dev.   Q1  Q3  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Q1  Q3 
LAF         5.291           5.300           0.555           4.908   5.610  5.246  5.146  0.584  4.919  5.504 
LTA         8.249           8.215           0.829           7.676   8.763  8.149  8.004  0.850  7.561  8.692 
SQRTSUBS         5.356           4.122           3.957           2.450   7.089  5.358  3.873  3.932  2.646  7.071 
CATA         0.497           0.506           0.227           0.350   0.640  0.541  0.572  0.237  0.352  0.686 
QUICK         2.109           1.234           3.858           0.851   1.940  2.002  1.311  3.307  0.860  1.910 
DE         0.179           0.151           0.177           0.009   0.294  0.165  0.130  0.168  0.010  0.261 
ROI         0.027           0.067           0.212           0.017   0.117  0.036  0.067  0.201  0  0.140 
FOREIGN         0.319           0.062           0.382                  0     0.686  0.305  0.088  0.365  0  0.670 
OPINION         0.056                 0             0.230                  0     0  0.035  0  0.184  0  0 
BUSY         0.612           1.000           0.488                  0     1.000  0.601  1.000  0.491  0  1.000 
LOSS         0.435                  0             0.496                  0     1.000  0.410  0  0.493  0  1.000 
LNAF         4.903           5.068           1.380           4.565   5.699  5.033  5.301  1.455  4.663  5.845 
LONDON         0.350                 0             0.478                  0     1.000  0.341  0  0.475  0  1.000 
INITIAL         0.430                  0             0.496                  0     1.000  0.179  0  0.385  0  0 
 
Variable Definitions: 
LAF = natural log of audit fees in GBP’000; LTA = natural log of total assets in GBP’000; SQRTSUBS = square root of total subsidiaries; CATA = ratio of current assets to total assets; QUICK = ratio of 
current assets (less inventories) to current liabilities; DE = ratio of long-term debt to total assets; ROI = ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets; FOREIGN = proportion of total sales from 
foreign operations; OPINION = indicator variable, 1 = qualified and going-concern audit report, 0 = otherwise; BUSY = indicator variable, 1 = December 31st or March 31st year-end, 0 = otherwise; LOSS 
= indicator variable, 1 = loss in any of the past three years, 0 = otherwise; LNAF = natural log of non-audit fees (in GBP’000) paid to the auditor; LONDON = indicator variable, 1 = if observation is a 
London-based company, 0 = otherwise; and INITIAL = indicator variable, 1= if the audit engagement is in either the first or second year, 0 = otherwise; and NAT = indicator variable, 1= companies audited 
by the Big 4 national industry leaders, 0 = otherwise; and CITY = indicator variable, 1= companies audited by the Big 4 city-specific industry leaders, 0 = otherwise; and JOINT = indicator variable, 1= 
companies audited by auditors that are joint (both) the national industry leader and the city-specific industry leader, 0 = otherwise; and CITY_ONLY = indicator variable, 1= companies audited by the city-
specific industry leader alone, without also being the national industry leader, 0 = otherwise; and NAT_ONLY = indicator variable, 1= companies audited by the national industry leader alone, without also 
being the city-specific industry leader, 0 = otherwise. 
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TABLE 4 
Correlation matrix 
 LAF LNAF LTA SQRTSUBS ROI LEV FOREIGN QUICK CATA OPINION LONDON BUSY LOSS 
LAF  1             
LNAF  0.57**  1            
LTA  0.90**  0.54**  1           
SQSRTSUBS  0.66**  0.41**  0.62**      1          
ROI  0.30**  0.20**  0.43**      0.25**  1         
LEV  0.40**  0.26**  0.43**      0.37**  0.16**  1        
FOREIGN  0.18**  0.09**  0.10**      0.04**  0.02  0.06**     1       
QUICK -0.29** -0.22** -0.24**     -0.20** -0.14** -0.22**    -0.08**  1      
CATA -0.18** -0.04** -0.27**     -0.06** -0.07** -0.3**    -0.05**  0.21**  1     
OPINION -0.13** -0.16** -0.18**     -0.13** -0.25** -0.06**     0.01  0.05** -0.07**     1    
LONDON  0.01 -0.05** -0.01     -0.06** -0.10** -0.05**     0.08**  0.14** -0.12**     0.09**  1   
BUSY  0.11**  0.08**  0.08**      0.07**  0.00  0.03**     0.09**  0.014 -0.04**     0.01  0.097**  1  
LOSS -0.33** -0.21** -0.41**     -0.20** -0.41** -0.12**    -0.01  0.22**  0.05**     0.15**  0.102**  0.01  1 
INITIAL -0.15** -0.10** -0.16**     -0.03** -0.08** -0.02    -0.06**  0.08**  0.00     0.01  0.011 -0.02*  0.15** 
NAT  0.15**  0.07**  0.13**      0.08**  0.05**  0.04**    -0.04** -0.06** -0.03    -0.01 -0.023  0.01 -0.04** 
CITY  0.11**  0.04**  0.09**      0.09**  0.030  0.05**    -0.03 -0.06** -0.03     0.01 -0.072**  0.01 -0.03 
JOINT  0.21**  0.09**  0.19**      0.09**  0.05**  0.06**    -0.03 -0.06** -0.08**    -0.01  0.008  0.02 -0.06** 
CITY_ONLY -0.09** -0.05** -0.09**      0.01 -0.02  0.00     0.00  0.00  0.05**     0.02 -0.103** -0.01  0.02 
NAT_ONLY -0.07** -0.02 -0.08**      0.01 -0.01 -0.02    -0.01 -0.00  0.08**    -0.01 -0.056** -0.01  0.02 
 
INITIAL NAT CITY JOINT 
CITY_ 
ONLY 
NAT_ 
ONLY 
       
INITIAL  1             
NAT  0.03  1            
CITY -0.02  0.49**  1           
JOINT -0.00  0.84**  0.67**      1          
CITY_ONLY -0.01 -0.34**  0.51**     -0.28**   1         
NAT_ONLY  0.07**  0.38** -0.25**     -0.17**  -0.13**  1        
*** significant at p < .01, ** significant at p < .05 and *significant at p < .10 respectively.  
Variable Definitions: 
LAF = natural log of audit fees in GBP’000; LTA = natural log of total assets in GBP’000; SQRTSUBS = square root of total subsidiaries; CATA = ratio of current assets to total assets; QUICK = ratio of 
current assets (less inventories) to current liabilities; DE = ratio of long-term debt to total assets; ROI = ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets; FOREIGN = proportion of total sales from 
foreign operations; OPINION = indicator variable, 1 = qualified and going-concern audit report, 0 = otherwise; BUSY = indicator variable, 1 = December 31st or March 31st year-end, 0 = otherwise; LOSS 
= indicator variable, 1 = loss in any of the past three years, 0 = otherwise; LNAF = natural log of non-audit fees (in GBP’000) paid to the auditor; LONDON = indicator variable, 1 = if observation is a 
London-based company, 0 = otherwise; and INITIAL = indicator variable, 1= if the audit engagement is in either the first or second year, 0 = otherwise; and NAT = indicator variable, 1= companies audited 
by the Big 4 national industry leaders, 0 = otherwise; and CITY = indicator variable, 1= companies audited by the Big 4 city-specific industry leaders, 0 = otherwise; and JOINT = indicator variable, 1= 
companies audited by auditors that are joint (both) the national industry leader and the city-specific industry leader, 0 = otherwise; and CITY_ONLY = indicator variable, 1= companies audited by the city-
specific industry leader alone, without also being the national industry leader, 0 = otherwise; and NAT_ONLY = indicator variable, 1= companies audited by the national industry leader alone, without also 
being the city-specific industry leader, 0 = otherwise. 
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TABLE 5 
Effects of Big 4 National and City-Specific Industry Leadership on Audit Fee Premium Relative to Big 4 Non-Leaders for the Period 2004-2011a 
          
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
  Exp. Sign  Estimate  T  Sig.  Estimate  t  Sig.  Estimate  t  Sig. 
Control Variables                    
(Constant) +/-  0.406  5.110  0.000  0.387  4.840  0.000  0.434  5.400  0.000 
LTA +  0.533  51.570  0.000  0.535  51.600  0.000  0.530  51.040  0.000 
SQRTSUBS +  0.027  11.880  0.000  0.027  11.810  0.000  0.027  11.920  0.000 
CATA +  0.199  6.320  0.000  0.201  6.380  0.000  0.202  6.430  0.000 
QUICK -  -0.010  -4.820  0.000  -0.010  -4.810  0.000  -0.010  -4.840  0.000 
DE +  -0.078  -2.130  0.033  -0.083  -2.260  0.024  -0.074  -2.010  0.044 
ROI -  -0.121  -3.810  0.000  -0.119  -3.740  0.000  -0.119  -3.800  0.000 
FOREIGN +  0.146  10.240  0.000  0.145  10.110  0.000  0.147  10.300  0.000 
OPINION +  0.026  0.860  0.390  0.025  0.830  0.409  0.026  0.840  0.401 
BUSY +  0.062  5.790  0.000  0.062  5.820  0.000  0.061  5.730  0.000 
LOSS +  0.048  3.730  0.000  0.049  3.780  0.000  0.047  3.690  0.000 
LNAF +  0.036  6.620  0.000  0.037  6.770  0.000  0.036  6.670  0.000 
LONDON +  0.078  7.030  0.000  0.080  7.200  0.000  0.077  6.920  0.000 
INITIAL -  -0.006  -0.460  0.648  -0.001  -0.110  0.914  -0.005  -0.430  0.669 
                    
Experimental Variables                    
NAT (N=830) +  0.055  5.340  0.000             
CITY (N=1,085) +        0.039  3.990  0.000       
JOINT (N=657) +              0.069  5.830  0.000 
CITY_ONLY (N=428) +              -0.004  -0.320  0.751 
NAT_ONLY (N=173) +              0.001  0.060  0.953 
                    
F statistic (p-value)   490.79 (<0.0001) 487.66 (<0.0001) 467.84 (<0.0001) 
Adjusted R2   0.861 0.860 0.862 
Sample size   2,388b 2,388b 2,388b 
 
a All p-values are two-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are not reported for brevity, and t-statistics and significance levels are calculated using the White (1980) robust standard errors to 
correct for heteroscedasticity. 
b The sample comprises 2,388 observations of U.K. public listed companies that are audited by Big 4 auditors. The sample size is derived after deleting 383 observations with less than two city-specific 
observations per industry from the initial Big 4 sample (N= 2,771 as reported in Table 1). This additional screening is performed as to ensure that the audit market for the all the cities in specific industries 
analysed is competitive where more than one audit client exists. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
LAF = natural log of audit fees in GBP’000; LTA = natural log of total assets in GBP’000; SQRTSUBS = square root of total subsidiaries; CATA = ratio of current assets to total assets; QUICK = ratio of 
current assets (less inventories) to current liabilities; DE = ratio of long-term debt to total assets; ROI = ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets; FOREIGN = proportion of total sales from 
foreign operations; OPINION = indicator variable, 1 = qualified and going-concern audit report, 0 = otherwise; BUSY = indicator variable, 1 = December 31st or March 31st year-end, 0 = otherwise; LOSS 
= indicator variable, 1 = loss in any of the past three years, 0 = otherwise; LNAF = natural log of non-audit fees (in GBP’000) paid to the auditor; LONDON = indicator variable, 1 = if observation is a 
London-based company, 0 = otherwise; and INITIAL = indicator variable, 1= if the audit engagement is in either the first or second year, 0 = otherwise; and NAT = indicator variable, 1= companies audited 
by the Big 4 national industry leaders, 0 = otherwise; and CITY = indicator variable, 1= companies audited by the Big 4 city-specific industry leaders, 0 = otherwise; and JOINT = indicator variable, 1= 
companies audited by auditors that are joint (both) the national industry leader and the city-specific industry leader, 0 = otherwise; and CITY_ONLY = indicator variable, 1= companies audited by the city-
specific industry leader alone, without also being the national industry leader, 0 = otherwise; and NAT_ONLY = indicator variable, 1= companies audited by the national industry leader alone, without also 
being the city-specific industry leader, 0 = otherwise.
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TABLE 6 
Effects of Big 4 National and City-Specific Industry Leadership on Audit Fee Premium Relative to Big 4 Non-Leaders in the Pre, During and Post Financial Crisis Periods 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Experimental variables 
Exp. 
Sign 
 Estimate  t  Sig.  Estimate  t  Sig.  Estimate  t  Sig. 
Pre financial crisis 2004 to 2006 (N=1,063)      
NAT (N=369) +  0.056  3.720  0.000             
CITY (N=489) +        0.049  3.420  0.004       
JOINT (N=269) +              0.079  4.360  0.000 
CITY_ONLY (N=220) +              0.024  1.270  0.204 
NAT_ONLY (N=100) +              0.025  0.950  0.340 
      
F statistic (p-value)   306.57 (<0.0001) 311.18 (<0.0001) 291.12 (<0.0001) 
Adjusted R2   0.877 0.876 0.877 
During financial crisis 2007 and 2008 (N=618)       
NAT (N=208) +  0.028  1.330  0.185             
CITY (N=271) +        0.023  1.120  0.262       
JOINT (N=174) +              0.039  1.630  0.104 
CITY_ONLY (N=97) +              -0.019  -0.650  0.518 
NAT_ONLY (N=34) +              -0.049  -1.100  0.270 
      
F statistic (p-value)   158.48 (<0.0001) 159.18 (<0.0001) 150.74 (<0.0001) 
Adjusted R2   0.853 0.853 0.854 
Post financial crisis 2009 to 2011 (N=707)       
NAT (N=253) +  0.071  4.150  0.000             
CITY (N=325) +        0.055  3.190  0.001       
JOINT (N=214) +              0.085  4.420  0.000 
CITY_ONLY (N=111) +              0.001  0.060  0.955 
NAT_ONLY (N=39) +              0.011  0.280  0.782 
                    
F statistic (p-value)   306.57 (<0.0001) 253.77 (<0.0001) 247.18 (<0.0001) 
Adjusted R2   0.880 0.879 0.881 
  
a All p-values are two-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are not reported for brevity, and t-statistics and significance levels are calculated using the White (1980) robust standard errors to 
correct for heteroscedasticity. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
NAT = indicator variable, 1= companies audited by the Big 4 national industry leaders, 0 = otherwise; and CITY = indicator variable, 1= companies audited by the Big 4 city-specific industry leaders, 0 = 
otherwise; and JOINT = indicator variable, 1= companies audited by auditors that are joint (both) the national industry leader and the city-specific industry leader, 0 = otherwise; and CITY_ONLY = 
indicator variable, 1= companies audited by the city-specific industry leader alone, without also being the national industry leader, 0 = otherwise; and NAT_ONLY = indicator variable, 1= companies 
audited by the national industry leader alone, without also being the city-specific industry leader, 0 = otherwise. 
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TABLE 7 
 Coefficients and Significance Levels of Specialization Variables in Robustness and Sensitivity Testsa 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 NAT  CITY  JOINT  CITY_ONLY  NAT_ONLY 
 Estimate 
 
Sig.  Estimate 
 
Sig.  Estimate 
 
Sig.  Estimate 
 
Sig.  Estimate 
 
Sig. 
                    
Drop incompetitive audit market in  
    city-specific industries (N = 2,299)b 
 
0.053 
 
 
 
0.000 
  
0.042 
 
 
 
0.000 
  
0.068 
 
 
 
0.000 
  
0.000 
  
0.995 
  
0.003 
  
0.892 
Alternative cut-off measuresc 0.047  0.000  0.035  0.000  0.065  0.000  -0.011  0.4887  0.016  0.268 
Based on ranked LAF (N = 2,388) 26.158  0.207  31.422  0.117  44.779  0.055  -2.292  0.937  -41.234  0.317 
Based on ranked LAF and LTA (N = 2,388) 76.256  0.000  59.536  0.007  97.720  0.000  0.042  .0.999  -3.103  0.932 
Based on total assets market share (N = 2,388) 0.036  0.001  -0.007  0.476  0.030  0.013  -0.061  0.000  -0.012  0.480 
Based on total sales market share (N = 2,388) 0.034  0.001  -0.002  0.818  0.035  0.005  -0.046  0.000  -0.151  0.374 
Large client segment (N = 1,194)d 0.075  0.000  0.049  0.001  0.083  0.000  -0.013  0.569  0.014  0.730 
Small client segment (N = 1,194)d 0.037  0.004  0.033  0.006  0.056  0.000  0.009  0.563  0.003  0.864 
High risk client (N = 1,194)e 0.062  0.000  0.029  0.047  0.069  0.000  -0.024  0.205  0.007  0.781 
Low risk client (N = 1,194)e 0.042  0.004  0.047  0.001  0.061  0.000  0.022  0.261  -0.004  0.898 
High growth client (N = 1,1904)f 0.050  0.001  0.029  0.040  0.055  0.001  -0.008  0.694  0.020  0.562 
Low growth client (N = 1,194)f 0.051  0.000  0.044  0.001  0.075  0.000  0.000  0.993  -0.013  0.571 
 
a All p-values are two-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are not reported for brevity, and t-statistics and significance levels are calculated using the White (1980) robust standard errors to 
correct for heteroscedasticity. 
b Drop incompetitive audit market in city-specific industries = The sample (N=2,299) is derived after deleting 89 observations from 36 city- industry combinations where there is only one auditor. 
c For the national industry leadership, we follow Neal and Riley (2004) which define the minimum market share for industry leader as 1.2 times the inverse of the number of  
  Big N auditors (1.2 X 1/Big 4 audit firms) = 30 percent. For the city-specific industry leadership, we follow Reichelt and Wang (2010)  by replacing the the number of Big N auditors with the average  
  number of auditor per city industry market, which computes to 48 percent (1.2 X 1/2.5), or approximately 50 percent. 
d Large (Small) client segment = companies with total assets above (below) the sample median of  GBP £241.9 million. 
eHigh (Low) risk client = companies with probability of bankruptcy score above (below) the sample median of 0.49. 
fHigh (Low) growth client = companies with market to book ratio above (below) the sample median of 0.89. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
NAT = indicator variable, 1= companies audited by the Big 4 national industry leaders, 0 = otherwise; and CITY = indicator variable, 1= companies audited by the Big 4 city-specific industry leaders, 0 = 
otherwise; and JOINT = indicator variable, 1= companies audited by auditors that are joint (both) the national industry leader and the city-specific industry leader, 0 = otherwise; and CITY_ONLY = 
indicator variable, 1= companies audited by the city-specific industry leader alone, without also being the national industry leader, 0 = otherwise; and NAT_ONLY = indicator variable, 1= companies 
audited by the national industry leader alone, without also being the city-specific industry leader, 0 = otherwise. 
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1 The term industry leader and industry specialist are used interchangeably throughout the paper. 
2 In addition, as a sensitivity analysis reported in later part of the paper, we drop each Big 4 audit firm and each of the 13 industries one at a 
time and the results are qualitatively unchanged, which indicates that individual Big 4 firms and individual industries do not drive the results. 
3 Since the tragedy of Great Depression in 1929-1933, the GFC which started in 2007 is one of the most significant economic events ever 
recorded in the history (Pal, 2010).   
4 FAME is an acronym for ‘‘Financial Analysis Made Easy,’’ a comprehensive database for U.K. private and publicly-listed companies 
maintained by Bureau Van Dijk. 
5 As the financial statement data and related ratios used for public listed companies in the financial services sectors qualitatively differ from 
other sectors, these companies are excluded from the sample. 
6 For sensitivity check in the later part of the paper, we also run similar analysis on the sample using the LSE’s two-digit SIC codes as used in 
Basioudis and Francis (2007), and the results are qualitatively the same. 
7 The three largest cities after London are Birmingham (eight percent), Manchester and Leeds (both at seven percent), while the remaining 
London-based companies are audited by audit offices not far away outside of London. 77 percent of the sample companies are located in 51 
cities outside of London and are audited by non-London offices of the audit firms. 
8 Following Berndt (1991, p. 164), the percentage magnitude of the positive intercept shift on the dependent variable (natural log of audit fees) 
is defined as ez-1, where z is the auditor coefficient value in the regression model. 
9 ibid. 
10 When we run the regressions (untabulated) on a yearly basis using the LSE’s two-digit SIC Codes industry classification as per Basioudis 
and Francis (2007), we find that the city-specific industry premium documented in Basioudis and Francis (2007) seems to be diminishing 
slowly, as there is still a slightly significant coefficient in 2004 and then it is completely wiped out in the following few years (at the 1% level 
of significance). 
11 We further test this proposition in the sensitivity analysis section. 
12 We use the value of the intercept as corrected by Geiger and Raghunandan (2001) which is -7.322. 
 
                                                          
